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 ICAC v Cunneen: the power to 
investigate corrupt conduct 
by Gareth Griffith 
 
Introduction 
Since its establishment in 1988, the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (ICAC) has been a major feature of the NSW 
political landscape, never more so than during the years of the 
55th Parliament, from 2011 to 2015. Weekly, often daily, new 
claims and findings of corruption were made, across the entire 
political landscape, from State to local politics, affecting the 
public and private sectors alike; in ICAC v Cunneen,1 ICAC’s 
reach extended into the legal profession. Margaret Cunneen SC 
is the State’s Deputy Senior Crown Prosecutor.  
In brief, that case concerned the powers of the ICAC to 
investigate allegations that Ms Cunneen, along with her son 
Stephen Wyllie, with the intention of perverting the course of 
justice, counselled her son’s girlfriend, Sophia Tilley, to pretend 
to have chest pains to divert police from conducting a blood 
alcohol test at the scene of an accident.2 The alleged conduct 
did not concern the exercise of Ms Cunneen’s official functions 
as a Crown Prosecutor. ICAC contended that the alleged 
conduct was corrupt conduct because it could adversely affect 
the exercise of official functions by the investigating police 
officers and by a court that would deal with any charges arising 
from the motor vehicle accident. The nub of the legal argument 
was whether such allegations constitute “corrupt conduct” under 
the ICAC Act 1988. In the relevant circumstances, by section 
8(2) of the Act, the conduct at issue could constitute “corrupt 
conduct” if it could “adversely affect” the exercise of official 
functions by a public official.  
The decision of the High Court, rejecting ICAC’s appeal and 
thereby restricting the breadth of its power to investigate corrupt 
conduct, has proved to be controversial. The ICAC 
Commissioner Megan Latham has called for the ICAC Act to be 
amended retrospectively, a submission Premier Baird is said to 
be considering.3 Jamie Parker, the Greens NSW anti-corruption 
spokesperson, is reportedly planning to introduce a Bill in the 
NSW Parliament to that effect.4 Indicating his support for 
legislative amendment, Labor’s Luke Foley suggested that the 
Joint Statutory Committee on the ICAC should hold an inquiry 
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into the ramifications of the High Court’s decision.5 Mr Foley is also 
reported as saying that “Labor wants to see a powerful statutory corruption 
fighter”, with consideration being given to the introduction of a Private 
Member’s Bill.6 
As for the Government’s position, it was reported on 1 May 2015 that: 
 
Premier Mike Baird met with ICAC Commissioner Megan Latham and 
Inspector-General David Levine this week but is still undecided over what 
to do about the mess caused by the corruption watchdog’s overreach in 
the Margaret Cunneen inquiry.7 
On 5 May 2015 The Daily Telegraph reported that: 
 
Premier Mike Baird is expected to announce today he will change the laws 
around ICAC to stop a series of lawsuits in the wake of prosecutor 
Margaret Cunneen’s win in the High Court against the corruption 
watchdog. Corruption findings already made will be protected under law 
changes expected to be approved by a special Cabinet meeting this 
morning as parliament sits for the first time post-election. But, as predicted 
by The Daily Telegraph last week, the government is also expected to 
announce a review into the future of ICAC and where the body goes from 
here in the wake of the Cunneen judgment.8 
Outlined in this e-brief is the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in 
Cunneen v ICAC, followed by a more detailed account of the High Court’s 
decision in ICAC v Cunneen. Commentaries on the potential implications of 
the High Court’s decision are also canvassed, along with potential options 
for the amendment of s 8(2) of the ICAC Act. The e-brief starts with a 
summary of the relevant provisions of that Act. 
The ICAC Act 1988 
The ICAC’s main function is to “promote the integrity and accountability of 
public administration” in NSW primarily by investigating, exposing and 
preventing “corruption involving or affecting public authorities and public 
officials” (s 2A). The term “public authorities” is defined in the Act to include 
“the NSW Police Force”; the term “public officials” is defined to mean “an 
individual having public official functions or acting in a public official 
capacity” and includes “a member of the NSW Police Force” and “a judge, 
a magistrate or the holder of any other judicial office (whether exercising 
judicial, ministerial or other functions)” (s 3(1)). 
Section 3 further defines “corrupt conduct” as having the meaning given by 
Part 3 of the Act, the key provisions of which are sections 7 and 8. Section 
7 provides that corrupt conduct is to be understood by reference to the 
description of it found in sections 8(1) and (2). For the majority of the High 
Court these sections must be read together.  
Section 8(1) provides that: 
(1) Corrupt conduct is: 
(a) any conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) that 
adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, 
the honest or impartial exercise of official functions by any public official, 
any group or body of public officials or any public authority, or 
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(b) any conduct of a public official that constitutes or involves the dishonest 
or partial exercise of any of his or her official functions, or 
(c) any conduct of a public official or former public official that constitutes 
or involves a breach of public trust, or 
(d) any conduct of a public official or former public official that involves the 
misuse of information or material that he or she has acquired in the course 
of his or her official functions, whether or not for his or her benefit or for the 
benefit of any other person. 
Relevantly, s 8(2) provides (in part) that: 
 
Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public 
official) that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly 
or indirectly, the exercise of official functions by any public official, any 
group or body of public officials or any public authority and which could 
involve any of the following matters: 
…. 
(g) perverting the course of justice… 
Section 8(2) imposes two requirements.9 The first limb is that the conduct at 
issue could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the exercise of 
official functions by any public official, any group or body of public officials 
or any public authority. For the second limb it is necessary that the conduct 
could involve one of the matters referred to in s 8(2)(a)-(y) of the Act, which 
includes reference to “perverting the course of justice”.  
Limiting the operation of section 8, section 9 then provides that conduct will 
only constitute corrupt conduct if it constitutes or involves certain matters, 
including “a criminal offence”; this is defined to mean “a criminal offence 
under the law of the State or under any other law relevant to the conduct in 
question”. Relevantly, s 319 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides: 
A person who does any act, or makes any omission, intending in any way 
to pervert the course of justice, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.  
Inserted in the ICAC Act in 2005 under Part 4 “Functions of the 
Commission” was section 12A which provides: 
In exercising its functions, the Commission is, as far as practicable, to 
direct its attention to serious corrupt conduct and systemic corrupt conduct 
and is to take into account the responsibility and role other public 
authorities and public officials have in the prevention of corrupt conduct. 
[emphasis added] 
Note that, as originally enacted the provision read “serious and systemic 
corrupt conduct”. In 2008 this was amended to read “serious corrupt 
conduct and systemic corrupt conduct”. As explained in the Second 
Reading speech for the ICAC Amendment Bill 2008: 
 
The bill will amend the Act to clarify that the Commission is to direct its 
attention to two types of corrupt conduct: serious corrupt conduct and 
systemic corrupt conduct. This amendment was recommended by the 
Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption to avoid 
any doubt in relation to the issue.10 
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Cunneen v ICAC (NSW Court of Appeal) 
Margaret Cunneen, Stephen Wyllie (her son) and Sophia Tilley (her son’s 
girlfriend) commenced proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court challenging 
the ICAC’s inquiry on a number of grounds, including that it was acting 
beyond its jurisdiction in investigating the allegations. In a decision handed 
down on 10 November 2014 in the common law division of the NSW 
Supreme Court, Hoeben CJ found in favour of the ICAC, including in 
respect to the approach taken to the interpretation of ‘corrupt conduct” in s 
8(2) of the ICAC Act.11 
Ms Cunneen and her fellow plaintiffs then commenced proceedings in the 
Court of Appeal challenging the ICAC’s inquiry on the basis that the 
allegations could not constitute “corrupt conduct” under the ICAC Act. By 
majority (Basten JA and Ward JA; Bathurst CJ dissenting), the appeal was 
upheld.  
A key issue again was the interpretation of s 8(2) of the ICAC Act, with the 
focus of judicial consideration falling on what is meant by the expression 
“adversely affecting directly or indirectly the exercise of official functions”. 
Similar to the “probity” approach taken by the majority judgment of the High 
Court, Basten JA was of the view that, for conduct that adversely affects or 
could adversely affect official conduct to constitute “corrupt conduct”, it 
must be conduct that has “the capacity to compromise the integrity of public 
administration”.12 It is not sufficient that the conduct in question “simply, for 
example, adversely affect government revenue”.13  
Similarly, Ward JA was of the opinion that for the first limb of the s 8(2) to 
be satisfied it is necessary for the conduct to have the capacity to divert the 
relevant public officer from the proper exercise of his or her functions. Her 
Honour observed that: 
 
What is required by the first part of the definition, in my opinion, is that the 
conduct the subject of the relevant allegation be conduct that has at least 
the potential to affect the exercise of the relevant public official's functions 
in a manner adverse to the public administration of justice in the sense of 
diverting the proper exercise of those functions.  
Conduct which could have a potential effect on the exercise of official 
functions in the sense that it might cause a different decision to be made or 
the functions to be exercised in a different manner but which does not have 
the potential to cause any "corruption" in the exercise by the public official 
of his or her functions, or which could have no adverse outcome when 
viewed from a public corruption perspective, is not conduct that could 
"adversely" affect the proper exercise of official functions in the relevant 
sense. 
In other words, if there is conduct which, though it might involve an attempt 
to pervert the course of justice, could not have the potential "adversely" to 
affect the exercise of official functions in the sense of diverting the proper 
exercise of those functions, such conduct would not in my opinion fall 
within the definition in s 8(2).14 
Rejecting ICAC’s appeal, for Basten JA and Ward JA alike, the conduct at 
issue – Ms Cunneen’s advice to Ms Tilley to pretend to have chest pains to 
divert police from conducting a blood alcohol test at the scene of an 
accident – was “not conduct that could adversely affect the exercise of 
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official functions by the investigating police officers” at the scene of the 
accident.15 As Basten JA concluded, “it could not be said that the police 
officer acted otherwise than honestly and impartially”.16  
According to the majority judgement of the High Court: 
Basten and Ward JJA both accepted that the alleged conduct had the 
capacity to affect detrimentally the exercise by the investigating police 
officers of their investigative powers, in the sense that the police officers 
might make a different decision or exercise their functions in a different 
manner. But their Honours considered that it did not have the capacity to 
lead the officers or any other public official into dishonest, partial or 
otherwise corrupt conduct. Consequently, it was not corrupt conduct within 
the meaning of s 8(2).17 
Bathurst CJ dissented, taking the view that the words “could adversely 
affect” under the first limb of s 8(2) “require no more than that the conduct 
have the potential to limit or prevent the proper exercise of official functions 
by the public official”.18  
In effect, Basten JA and Ward JA preferred a narrower interpretation of the 
first limb of s 8(2) based on the motives of public officials in the 
performance of their official functions, requiring them to be made in bad 
faith in order to constitute corrupt conduct. Bathurst CJ on the other hand 
favoured a broader interpretation that looked to the effect or outcome of 
decisions made, whether made in good or bad faith. The focus in this 
second approach is not on the integrity of the individual public official at the 
point where a decision is made; rather, it is on the integrity of the process 
and of public administration and on the outcomes produced. 
ICAC v Cunneen (the High Court) 
The High Court held by majority (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Nettle JJ; 
Gageler J dissenting) that the ICAC did not have the power to investigate 
the alleged conduct, because the alleged conduct was not “corrupt 
conduct” as defined in s 8(2) of the ICAC Act.  
The joint majority judgment: An approach akin to the narrower 
interpretation favoured by Basten JA and Ward JA was upheld by the High 
Court. The summary of the decision explained that: 
 
The majority held that the expression "adversely affect" in s 8(2) refers to 
conduct that adversely affects or could adversely affect the probity of the 
exercise of an official function by a public official. The definition of "corrupt 
conduct" does not extend to conduct that adversely affects or could 
adversely affect merely the efficacy of the exercise of an official function by 
a public official in the sense that the official could exercise the function in a 
different manner or make a different decision.  
 
The alleged conduct was not conduct that could adversely affect the 
probity of the exercise of an official function by a public official. The alleged 
conduct was therefore not corrupt conduct within the meaning of s 8(2) of 
the ICAC Act and ICAC has no power to conduct the inquiry. 
The joint judgment set out its approach to the interpretation of s 8(2) at the 
outset, stating: 
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"Adversely affect" is a protean expression. In this context, however, there 
are only two possibilities. Either it means adversely affect or could 
adversely affect the probity of the exercise of an official function by a public 
official, or it means adversely affect or could adversely affect the efficacy of 
the exercise of an official function by a public official in the sense that the 
official could exercise the function in a different manner or make a different 
decision from that which would otherwise be the case. 
 
The former meaning accords with the ordinary understanding of corruption 
in public administration and consequently with the principal objects of the 
ICAC Act as set out in s 2A. The latter would result in the inclusion in 
"corrupt conduct" of a broad array of criminal offences and other unlawful 
conduct having nothing to do with the ordinary understanding of corruption 
in public administration or the principal objects of the ICAC Act. It would 
also enable the Independent Commission Against Corruption ("ICAC") to 
exercise its extraordinary coercive powers (with consequent abrogation of 
fundamental rights and privileges) in areas ranging well beyond the 
ordinary understanding of corruption in public administration and the 
principal objects of the ICAC Act. For those reasons, and the reasons 
which follow, the former meaning is to be preferred.19  
In arriving at this conclusion, the majority reviewed the history of the ICAC 
Act and amendments and proposed amendments to it. Particularly 
significant in this last respect was the 2005 Final Report of the Independent 
Review of the ICAC Act by Bruce McClintock SC. That report was the basis 
for the insertion in 2005 of sections 2A and 12A into the ICAC Act. The 
report also reviewed s 8(2) in this context of its legislative setting, notably in 
respect to s 9. As the majority decision acknowledged, McClintock’s 
interpretation of s 8(2) was consistent with the dissenting views of Gageler 
J (High Court) and Bathurst CJ (NSW Court of Appeal). According to the 
McClintock review:  
 
Section 8(2) corrupt conduct can be distinguished from section 8(1) 
conduct as it requires no wrongdoing on behalf of the public official. The 
conduct is corrupt because of its potential to adversely affect official 
functions, not because of any wrongdoing by the official. An example of 
section 8(2) corruption might be fraudulent action by person A that caused 
a public official to unknowingly hand over money to which person A was 
not entitled. This amounts to corruption because it undermines the integrity 
of public administration by the wrongful payment of public monies.20 
The review recommended that: 
 
consideration should be given to re-drafting section 8 to distinguish more 
clearly between corrupt conduct by public officials and corruption of public 
administration, the latter being conduct that does not require any 
wrongdoing on the part of a public official. This could be achieved by 
section 8(2) corruption being classified as indirect corruption, placed in a  
separate section, and no longer being subject to the operation of section 9.  
Alternatively, it could be placed in a separate section, the list of items of  
criminal conduct deleted but remain subject to section 9.21 
In the opinion of the majority judgment, the McClintock approach was “not 
an accurate assessment of the effect of s 8(2) and, in any event, the 
recommendation was not adopted”.22 
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The majority judgment then set out its approach to statutory interpretation, 
as a prelude to its interpretation of s 8(2). The dissenting Bathurst CJ 
approach was rejected on the grounds that: 
it assumes that the plain and ordinary meaning of "adversely affect" is its 
broadest possible meaning and does not attempt any kind of reconciliation 
of the meaning of that expression with the statutory context in which it 
appears.23 
Rejected too were the approaches adopted by Basten JA and Ward JA, as 
“susceptible to circularity” - by first assuming the purpose of the Act and 
then reasoning, syllogistically, that “because a meaning of ‘adversely affect’ 
limited to an adverse effect on probity is more consonant with the assumed 
purpose of the Act, that meaning should be preferred”.24 
Instead, the majority High Court judgment adopted an approach based on 
the examination of relative consistency, arguing that: 
It is impossible to identify the purpose of the ICAC Act (and, therefore, 
impossible to establish a major premise against which to compare the 
relative consistencies of the competing constructions of ss 8 and 9) without 
reference to the scope of operation of the Act as defined by ss 8 and 9. For 
the same reason, it is not open to express a conclusion as to the meaning 
of "adversely affect" in s 8(2) in terms of absolute validity. The best that 
can be done is to reason in terms of relative consistency – internal logical 
consistency and overall consistency in accordance with the principles of 
statutory interpretation adumbrated in Project Blue Sky – to determine 
which of the two competing constructions of "adversely affect" is more 
harmonious overall.25 
As to the result of the majority’s deliberations, it is enough to say that, from 
the symmetry between s 8(2) and s 8(1), it was inferred that:  
the expression "adversely affect" in s 8(2) means to adversely affect the 
exercise of an official function by a public official in such a way that the 
exercise constitutes or involves conduct of the kind identified in s 8(1)(b)-
(d). 
Referred to in sub-sections 8(1)(b)-(d) were such matters as “the dishonest 
or partial exercise” of official functions, conduct that amounts to “a breach 
of public trust” and the “misuse of information or material” acquired in the 
course of official functions. 
From there it was a relatively small step to arrive at the narrower 
interpretation of s 8(2), confined to the issue of probity. For the majority: 
the more compelling, construction of s 8(2) is that, if the conduct in 
question "could involve" any of the matters in pars (a)-(y) and if the 
conduct adversely affects or could adversely affect the probity of the 
exercise of an official function in one of the ways listed in s 8(1)(b)-(d), the 
conduct is "corrupt conduct".26 
The competing and broader view of s 8(2) would result “in the inclusion in 
the definition of ‘corrupt conduct’ of a wide variety of offences having 
nothing to do with corruption in public administration as that concept is 
commonly understood”.27 Ten examples were provided in the majority 
judgment, which went on to make this broader comment: 
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The principle of legality, coupled with the lack of a clearly expressed 
legislative intention to override basic rights and freedoms on such a 
sweeping scale as ICAC's construction would entail, points strongly 
against an intention that ICAC's coercive powers should apply to such a 
wide range of kinds and severity of conduct. So does the impracticality of a 
body with such a wide jurisdiction effectively discharging its functions. It 
would be at odds with the objects of the Act reflected in s 2A. It would be 
inconsistent with the assurances in the extrinsic materials earlier referred 
to that ICAC was not intended to function as a general crime commission. 
And, last but by no means least, as Basten JA observed, an extended 
meaning of "corrupt conduct" would be far removed from the ordinary 
conception of corruption in public administration.28 
The judgment continued: 
 
Logically it is more likely and textually it is more consonant with accepted 
canons of statutory construction that the object of s 8(2) was to extend the 
reach of ICAC's jurisdiction no further than to offences of the kind listed in 
s 8(2)(a)-(y) which could adversely affect the probity of the exercise of 
official functions by public officials in one of the ways described in s 
8(1)(b)-(d).29 
In respect to the ICAC Act more generally, it was said that: 
the provisions of the ICAC Act as a whole (including s 2A) operate more 
harmoniously on the footing that the Act is directed towards promoting the 
integrity and accountability of public administration in the sense of 
maintaining probity in the exercise of official functions. That is the context 
from which the relevant concept of "corruption" emerges.30 
In effect the majority agreed with Basten JA that, further to s 2A, the 
“explicit mischief to which the Act is directed is ‘corruption involving or 
affecting public authorities and public officials’ and the detrimental effect of 
such corruption on ‘public administration and on the community’”.31 
The minority judgment: Alone in dissent, Gageler J said he preferred a 
reading of s 8(2): 
as descriptive of conduct having the potential to limit or prevent the 
exercise of an official function by a public official, without necessity for any 
wrongdoing on the part of that public official.32 
For Gageler J, the categories of corrupt conduct described in s 8(1) and s 
8(2) are “not to be read as limiting each other”;33 the focus of s 8(1) being 
on conduct “involving” public officials and the focus of s 8(2) on that 
“affecting” public officials.34  
For what were described as “a number of mutually reinforcing textual 
reasons”, Gageler J sided therefore with the broader “efficacy” 
interpretation of Bathurst CJ. Included among the “reasons” were that the 
words “could adversely affect” in s 8(2) are given an ordinary grammatical 
meaning, connoting no more than impediment or impairment, and that the 
“efficacy” interpretation avoids reading into s 8(2) a limitation or qualification 
that is not expressed in the text.35 
The potential breadth of the “efficacy” reading of s 8(2) was acknowledged 
by Gageler J, as extending to “some” conduct falling within the ten 
examples enumerated by the majority and, as in the Cunneen case, to 
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ICAC having power to investigate an isolated case of a witness telling a lie 
to a police officer.36  
On the other hand, serious practical limitations would follow from the 
narrower “probity” interpretation, with Gageler J stating: 
 
What is equally important to acknowledge, however, is that a consequence 
of limiting the first condition in s 8(2) to conduct which has the potential to 
lead to some want of probity on the part of a public official in the exercise 
of an official function is entirely to exclude from the definition of corrupt 
conduct a case of fraud on a public official or of conspiracy to defraud a 
public official (within the subject matters of pars (e) and (y) of s 8(2)) which 
entails no wrongdoing by the public official. That is so no matter how 
widespread the conduct might appear and no matter how detrimental its 
effects on public administration or on the community or the environment.37 
Dismissed by Gageler J was the “principle of legality” argument as a basis 
for the narrower interpretation of the ICAC’s investigative powers.38 More 
positively, the “probity” interpretation was said to be supported by 
legislative history, as well as by reference to the McClintock report. 
According to Gageler J, the insertion of sections 2A and 12A were based 
“almost word-for-word” on that report and were to be read in the wider 
context of its recommendations for the amendment of s 8(2).39 Moreover, 
there was nothing to suggest in the legislative history of s 2A that it was 
intended “to confine or otherwise affect the definition of corrupt conduct in 
ss 7 to 9 of the ICAC Act”.40 As for Parliament’s non-amendment of s 8(2) 
along the lines proposed in that report, Gageler J argued: 
That a legislature has refrained from amending a statutory provision 
following receipt of a report explaining the provision to have a particular 
textually available meaning is a factor which tells in favour of not departing 
from that meaning in construing the provision in the context of the statute 
as otherwise amended. The weight to be afforded to any such aspect of 
legislative history must, of course, vary with the circumstances.41 
Consequences and comments  
The stakes in the Cunneen case were always high. Writing in the Sydney 
Morning Herald in January 2015, Michaela Whitbourn commented that, as 
a result of the adverse majority judgment of the NSW Court of Appeal, the 
ICAC had:  
deferred releasing its reports in high-profile inquiries into Obeid-linked 
company Australian Water Holdings and Liberal Party donations until the 
Cunneen case is resolved.42 
Writing in March 2015, Sydney lawyer Tim Dick said the High Court’s 
decision would have “profound consequences for NSW”. He asked: 
Will it declare that the Commission has the power to hold what appears to 
be a questionable inquiry into Cunneen, or will it put a disastrous limitation 
on the Commission’s power to fight corruption?43 
In the event, the fall-out from the High Court’s decision was immediate. The 
Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial of 16 April 2015 said in part that: 
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The High Court has limited the power of the NSW anti-corruption watchdog 
in a way that will dangerously undermine community trust in governments, 
politician and public officials.  
Dozens of findings by the ICAC, including some involving Labor and 
Liberal figures, are under a cloud. While cases involving former Labor 
ministers Eddie Obeid and Ian Macdonald are unlikely to be affected, many 
investigations aimed at unlocking systemic corruption will never be 
pursued.44 
ICAC itself was under scrutiny. On 17 April 2015 the Daily Telegraph 
reported that: 
In an unprecedented move, the Inspector of ICAC, David Levine, has 
revealed he has asked the commission to also explain the implications it 
sees as a result of its defeat in the High Court on Wednesday. The move 
came as the ICAC’s powers came into question again yesterday in 
Downing Centre Local Court after it instigated a prosecution against 
disgraced former Labor minister Ian Macdonald.45 
On 20 April 2015 the ICAC issued this public statement: 
 
The decision in this matter about the scope of section 8(2) of the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 by the majority of 
the High Court of Australia adopted a construction of the section that had 
never previously been argued or accepted since the ICAC's inception. 
 
The narrow construction given to section 8(2) by the Court will substantially 
damage the Commission's ability to carry out its corruption investigation 
and corruption prevention functions. 
 
The decision means that the Commission will be unable to investigate or 
report on several current operations, and will severely restrict its ability to 
report on Operations Spicer and Credo.  
 
It has the potential to involve the State of NSW and the Commission in 
costly and protracted litigation involving persons who have been the 
subject of corrupt conduct findings based on investigations conducted 
under section 8(2), and will affect current litigation involving such findings. 
It also has the potential to call into question the prosecutions and 
convictions of persons where evidence against them was obtained during 
Commission investigations based on section 8(2). 
 
In the Commission's view, the narrow construction adopted by the majority 
in the High Court is contrary to the legislative intention evidenced by the 
second reading speech when the ICAC Act was first introduced, the 
analysis of the section in the report of the McClintock review of the ICAC 
Act and the ordinary meaning of the words used in the section. 
 
In the circumstances, the Commission has made a submission to the NSW 
Government to consider, as a matter of priority, amending section 8(2) to 
ensure that the section can operate in accordance with its intended scope 
and making any such amendment retrospective. 
 
The Commission will be making no further comment on this matter at this 
time. 
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The statement earned the Commission the sobriquet of “poor loser” from no 
other than the Inspector of the ICAC.46 The Daily Telegraph reported on 21 
April 2015: 
In one of the most serious attacks ever on the commission, the former 
Supreme Court judge who oversees the commission, Justice David Levine, 
has urged the government to avoid any “knee jerk” reaction that would turn 
it into a second police force or crime commission. Legal sources said the 
future of the commission’s current administration, including its 
commissioner Megan Latham, is now under a cloud.47 
Several commentators came out on different sides of the argument, for and 
against the ICAC’s position. Professor Gary Sturgess and former Premier 
Nick Greiner, both architects of the ICAC, thought the High Court had “got it 
right”.48 Conversely, former Premier Bob Carr thought “everything should be 
considered” including retrospective legislation to ensure that the ICAC 
retains “robust powers”,49 a position supported by another former Premier 
Morris Iemma.50  
Bruce McClintock said that, had the amendment he recommended to s 8(2) 
in 2005 been enacted, the ICAC’s powers to undertake the Cunneen 
investigation would not have been in doubt. However, as matters stood, he 
could see “arguments on both sides”. Mr McClintock also expressed the 
view that “ICAC should not have commenced the Cunneen investigation”.51  
Citing the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, Malcom Stewart, vice-
president of the Rule of Law Institute, counselled against passing 
retrospective legislation, saying that the Commission “wants a free pass for 
contravening its own governing statute”.52 
By 27 April 2015 the Sydney Morning Herald was reporting that at least 50 
findings by the ICAC over the past decade had been “thrown into doubt” by 
the Cunneen case. The relevant ICAC inquiries were listed by Michaela 
Whitbourn as follows:53 
 
2013 OPERATION JASPER  
Travers Duncan and his associates John McGuigan, John Atkinson and Richard 
Poole found to have acted corruptly by concealing Obeids' involvement in coal 
tenement. ICAC will agree to findings being set aside. 
2013 OPERATION ACACIA 
Former union boss John Maitland and his associates Craig Ransley, Andrew Poole 
and Mike Chester found to have made or agreed to Maitland making "false and 
misleading" statements to officials.  
2011 OPERATION CHARITY 
Money fraudulently obtained from the Royal Hospital for Women and Royal North 
Shore Hospital. Two findings. 
2011 OPERATION CARINA 
Misuse by private citizens of Land and Property Management Authority database. 
Four findings 
2010 OPERATION SEGOMO 
Barrister and solicitor knowingly misled courts to assist clients and agreed to 
submit deliberately inflated claim for legal costs. Two findings. 
2009 OPERATION COLUMBA 
People running security training course improperly assisted candidates to get 
licences from the Security Industry Registry. Ten findings. 
2006 OPERATION CADMUS 
Falsification of Community Service Order time sheets. Eight findings. 
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2005 OPERATION AMBROSIA 
Schemes to fraudulently obtain building licences. At least 21 findings. 
 
Premier Baird is reported to be “open to whatever's required to ensure 
those who have been found corrupt don't get away with it", including 
retrospective laws.54 The Government’s position will be formulated after 
consultation with Commissioner Latham and with the benefit of 
independent legal advice. Mr Baird has said that the Government wants a 
“strong ICAC” but that it would “consider this with a cool head”.55 As noted, 
it was reported on 1 May 2015 that the Government may order a review of 
the ICAC and its operation.56  
 
In the meantime, the ICAC faces a new wave of litigation with several 
persons seeking to have corruption findings against them overturned. On 2 
May the Sydney Morning Herald reported that: 
 
As the Baird government considers calls by the ICAC to pass retrospective 
laws to shore up its powers, former Doyles Creek Mining directors Andrew 
Poole, Craig Ransley and Mike Chester have asked the Supreme Court to 
revisit corruption findings made against them.57 
Where next? 
Amending s 8(2): A point of general agreement is that, in the words of 
Gageler J: 
 
The structure of the definition in ss 7, 8 and 9 of the ICAC Act is complex, 
and the language in which each of its component sections is framed is 
cumbersome.58 
In light of this ambiguous legislative context, the majority judgment of the 
High Court took the view that the meaning of s 8(2), in particular of the 
words “adversely affect” in its first limb, could not be resolved “in terms of 
absolute validity” - “The best that could be done is to reason in terms of 
relative consistency”.59 It is with that degree of certainty that the majority 
declared its “probity” reading of s 8(2). 
Either way seemingly, whichever interpretation is supported, there is a case 
for legislative amendment: from the narrower “probity” view to clarify that 
interpretation in the interest of the intelligibility of the law to the community 
at large; from the broader “efficacy” view to reinstate an interpretation that 
has been relied upon by the ICAC for over two decades in its endeavours 
to promote integrity in public administration in this State.  
From the narrower viewpoint, the amendment might be achieved by the 
simple insertion of the words “the probity of” into s 8(2), without need for 
further elaboration. As amended, the first limb of s 8(2) would read: 
 
Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public 
official) that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly 
or indirectly, the probity of the exercise of official functions by any public 
official, any group or body of public officials or any public authority… 
The same strategy might also be adopted in support of the broader 
viewpoint, with an amended s 8(2) reading: 
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Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public 
official) that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly 
or indirectly, the efficacy of the exercise of official functions by any public 
official, any group or body of public officials or any public authority… 
One difficulty with that approach is that it would not address the concerns of 
the majority judgment as to the potential breadth of the application of s 8(2), 
as set out in the judgment’s ten enumerated examples. These examples 
are varied in nature, reflecting the offences under s 8(2)(a)-(y). For 
instance: 
 
If a thief stole one of a public authority's vehicles – say a garbage truck – 
the theft would qualify as corrupt conduct under s 8(2)(f) because, having 
lost the use of the truck, the authority could be rendered less able to 
discharge its official function of collecting garbage.60 
Such an example may seem fanciful, except that, by its pursuit of Cunneen, 
it might be said that the ICAC employed its investigative powers in an 
unpredictable way, one not readily associated with the legislative direction 
in s 12A to “direct its attention to serious corrupt conduct and systemic 
corrupt conduct”. Telling in this respect was Gageler J’s opening remark 
that “The question is not about the propriety or prudence of ICAC choosing 
to undertake the particular investigation in this case”.61 
To limit the application of ICAC’s investigative powers to what might be 
called “core” mandate, an alternative approach to amending s 8(2) can be 
suggested. This would be to incorporate the words of s 12A into s 8(2), in 
addition to the words “the efficacy of”, so that the amended provision would 
read: 
 
Corrupt conduct is also any serious corrupt conduct or systemic 
corrupt conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) that 
adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, 
the efficacy of the exercise of official functions by any public official, any 
group or body of public officials or any public authority… 
As noted, these suggested approaches are in addition to those found in the 
2005 McClintock report, which said the amendment of s 8(2): 
 
could be achieved by section 8(2) corruption being classified as indirect 
corruption, placed in a separate section, and no longer being subject to the 
operation of section 9. Alternatively, it could be placed in a separate 
section, the list of items of criminal conduct deleted but remain subject to 
section 9.62 
Amendment to have retrospective effect? In its public statement on 20 
April 2015 the ICAC submitted that the amendment of s 8(2) should be 
retrospective. Perhaps more than any other aspect of the debate that has 
developed since the High Court handed down its judgment, it is this 
suggested retrospective amendment that has caused the greatest 
consternation.  
The courts generally assume that legislation is not intended to operate 
retrospectively, a presumption that is “most strictly applied in relation to 
Acts creating an offence because of the manifest injustice that the 
alternative approach would bring about”.63 Often quoted is the passage 
from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes: “Upon the presumption that 
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the legislature does not intend which is unjust rests the leaning against 
giving certain statutes a retrospective operation”.64 The broad rule is that 
Parliaments have the power to pass retrospective legislation; if they do so, 
the courts “will proceed on an assumption that Parliament intended to act 
fairly”.65  
Specifically in respect to retrospectivity and the criminal law, it is the case 
that the ICAC stands in a somewhat anomalous position. As Malcolm 
Stewart explained: 
 
ICAC is not authorised to make a finding of guilt or even to recommend 
someone be prosecuted, let alone impose a penalty. The only finding ICAC 
can make is a finding of corrupt conduct. However, such a finding had very 
significant implications for the person concerned, in particular its impact on 
their reputation.66 
It is also the case that, further to a finding of corrupt conduct, the ICAC can 
recommend that that the DPP give consideration to prosecuting individuals 
for criminal offences. Further to s 113 of the ICAC Act, evidence acquired 
by the ICAC may be made available to the court in relevant criminal 
proceedings.  
In the present circumstances the key issues would seem to be twofold: 
• without retrospective legislation, the ICAC will be limited in respect 
to investigations already under way, those which have now been 
found to be beyond its jurisdiction; and 
• without retrospective legislation, former corrupt conduct findings 
may be overturned. 
Mr Stewart stated: 
 
If ICAC has previously made a finding of corrupt conduct that it should not 
have made or is currently conducting an investigation it should not be 
undertaking, those findings and investigations should not now be given the 
sanction of the NSW parliament.67 
Lawyer Scott McDonald has commented that: 
A guiding principle of the rule of law is that laws are enacted prospectively 
so that citizens are informed of the law in advance and can ensure that 
their conduct is lawful. 
It is wrong for ICAC to suggest that retrospective legislation might avoid 
costly and protracted litigation.68 
A weighty counterbalance is found in the views of former ICAC 
Commissioner David Ipp, stating: 
The [High Court’s] decision does not validate the conduct that ICAC 
inferred was corrupt and does not vindicate that conduct. Retrospective 
legislation, which would give ICAC the powers it thought it had, would allow 
the facts exposed by ICAC to be used by various law enforcement 
agencies for prosecution purposes in the way the ICAC Act contemplates. 
Without such legislation, damning evidence of this kind is likely to be 
unusable. This is one of the many reasons why such retrospective 
legislation should be passed as soon as possible.69 
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It is further suggested that the issue of retrospectivity raises difficult 
considerations of political practice. Writing in The Daily Telegraph, Andrew 
Clennell commented: 
 
Mr Baird would face party room opposition to retrospective legislation. He 
would also face criticism if some of his former MPs — such as Tim Owen 
and Andrew Cornwell, who were not public officials when they took cash 
from a developer — escaped corruption findings if Operation Spicer 
collapsed.70 
The meaning of corruption and the scope of ICAC’s powers: 
Retrospectivity is one issue of principle and practice raised in this context. 
Central to the broader debate is whether the scope of the ICAC’s 
investigative powers should extend to the integrity of the outcomes of public 
administration, even where no impropriety, wrongdoing or bad faith is 
imputed to any public official? 
The concern of the majority of the High Court was that this would extend 
the meaning of “corrupt conduct” to one “far removed from the ordinary 
conception of corruption in public administration”.71 That would seem to 
concur with the meaning of corruption set out in the standard text, 
Corruption and Misuse of Public Office by Colin Nicholls et al where it is 
said that the “popular meaning” of corruption “encompasses all those 
situations where agents and public officers break the confidence entrusted 
to them”.72 It would also seem to concur with the dictionary and legal 
definitions of corruptions set out in the same text.  
Conversely, experience in NSW indicates that the integrity of public 
administration, understood in terms of outcomes, can be corrupted by 
indirect means, where public officials are deceived into making decisions 
the efficacy of which are less than optimal. Two examples drawn from 
previous ICAC reports were presented in Gageler J’s dissenting judgment, 
concerning which he commented: 
 
In both examples, ICAC investigated and reported on conduct which had 
the potential to impair the efficacy of an exercise of an official function by a 
public official. Neither would have been within ICAC's power had s 8(2) 
been interpreted as confining corrupt conduct to conduct having the 
potential to impair the probity of an exercise of an official function by a 
public official.73 
As formulated by Gageler J, the “probity” reading would mean that the 
ICAC would have: 
 
no power to investigate, expose, prevent or educate about State-wide 
endemic collusion among tenderers in tendering for government contracts; 
as well as ICAC having no power to investigate, expose, prevent or 
educate about serious and systemic fraud in the making of applications for 
licences, permits or clearances issued under New South Wales statutes 
designed to protect health or safety (such as the Child Protection (Working 
with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) or the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 
(NSW)) or under New South Wales statutes designed to facilitate the 
management and commercial exploitation of valuable State-owned natural 
resources (such as the Mining Act 1992 (NSW), the Fisheries Management 
Act 1994 (NSW) or the Forestry Act 2012 (NSW)).74 
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Certainly, in the wake of the High Court’s decision and in light of the many 
Obeid-related inquiries undertaken by the ICAC over recent years, there is 
a body of opinion in NSW that fears that a loophole for the unscrupulous 
has been discovered. From that standpoint, one might say that in NSW, by 
the ICAC’s work, a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the 
practical means by which corruption can impact upon public administration 
has come into focus and that it is this understanding which should be 
unambiguously inserted in any amendment of the ICAC Act.  
In the words of former ICAC Commissioner David Ipp: 
The High Court has found that corrupt conduct under the ICAC Act only 
occurs when a public official has acted dishonestly (without "probity"), and 
not when dishonest persons deceive innocent public officials. This means, 
for example, that ICAC cannot investigate allegations of serious and 
systemic fraud in state elections or in the making of applications for mining 
and other licences. Surely this is a perversion of the community's idea of 
what ICAC should be doing. It is important that this be remedied by the 
government.75 
As Mr Ipp acknowledged, the alternative view is that such instances of 
corruption should be investigated, not by the ICAC with its distinctive 
inquisitorial powers, but by the police. To which Mr Ipp responded: “Of 
course, the police could investigate this kind of corrupt conduct, but the fact 
is they seldom do”.  
At its broadest the current debate goes to the very rationale for the 
existence of the ICAC as an investigative body that complements the roles 
performed by other criminal justice agencies. The Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on the ICAC defined the Commission’s “primary role” as “being 
an investigative, ‘truth-seeking’ body, rather than being another law 
enforcement body”.76 The McClintock report said this of ICAC’s role: 
 
Its particular focus must be matters for which there is no other remedy – 
where there are serious allegations of corruption that are not amenable to 
ordinary policing methods, where there are corruption risks, or where 
public officials or bodies are unwilling or unable to investigate corruption 
allegations or implement anti-corruption strategies.77 
“Corrupt conduct” in other jurisdictions 
 
Other Australian jurisdictions have anti-corruption bodies comparable to the 
ICAC. Bearing in mind the complex statutory interpretation undertaken by 
the High Court to arrive at the correct meaning of “corrupt conduct” under s 
8(2) of the ICAC Act, one must approach any comparable definitions in the 
legislation of other States with caution. The following comments are 
therefore tentative in nature, with the interpretation based solely on the face 
of the legislation. All of the relevant provisions in the other jurisdictions 
appear to be limited to matters of “probity”. 
 
The key provisions are listed below: 
 
• Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 15: basically the provision 
combines elements of ss 8(1) and (2) of the ICAC Act but appears 
to limit the scope of corrupt conduct to matters of probity. 
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• Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 
(Vic), s 4: again the provision borrows from the ICAC formulation 
but appears to be limited to the probity approach, with a focus on 
the honesty and trust of public officials. 
 
• Integrity Commission Act 2009 (Tas), s 4: It is explained in a 
commentary on the statute that “misconduct” under the Act does not 
include “administrative decisions or actions by public authorities 
where there is no suggestion that the decisions were made 
dishonestly or improperly”. 
 
• Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012 (SA), s 5: 
The terms “corruption, misconduct and maladministration” are 
separately defined, with corruption defined in connection with 
specified offences relating to breaches of public trust. 
 
• Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA), s 4: The term 
“misconduct” is defined in relation to public officials and is restricted 
to the “probity” approach. Neither the term “corruption” nor “corrupt 
conduct” is defined. 
Conclusion 
As discussed in the Research Service’s Key Issues for the 56th Parliament, 
the ICAC’s lead role in the drama of NSW politics has resulted in questions 
being asked of the Commission itself, including questions about ICAC’s 
procedures, with the damage done to high profile reputations.78 Criticism 
has also accompanied the Cunneen case and its aftermath. An editorial in 
The Daily Telegraph from 21 April 2015 commented: 
So the blame entirely lies with ICAC itself for trying on a flimsy case and as 
a result losing much of its previous impressive reputation and a great deal 
of power besides.79 
The decision in ICAC v Cunneen presents an opportunity for a thorough 
reconsideration of the appropriate scope and nature of the Commission’s 
powers. What do we want ICAC to do on behalf of the people of NSW? 
What is its purpose? 
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